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On March 31, the 2002 election season culminated with the polling day. While exact
figures are still unavailable, and the results themselves will be the issue of another article,
some conclusions about the campaign itself can be made. The political fashion of this
season gave preference to dark colors, and the «election accessories» were predominantly
very sharp and sometimes damaged the look of political models…
Analyzing the course of the campaign, Ukrainian politicians differ in their opinions about
its quality. Some argue that the campaign was «cleaner» and more fair that the previous
ones. Others maintain the opposite was the case and argue that «dirty techniques» and the
administrative pressure were the distinguishing features of the campaign. For instance,
leader of the United Social Democrats (SDPU(o)) Victor Medvedchuk claims that «this
campaign has been more civilized than the previous one, closer to international
standards» (Den, March 28, 2002). His view is not shared by leader of the Socialists
Oleksandr Moroz. In his opinion, «the current campaign differs from the previous ones
by even more blunt use of administrative resource and the sense of impunity among the
power-holders and crimes in that field.» Specifically, in his view, «that has been
manifested by persecution of forces that are in opposition – and not just in opposition – to
the authorities, by the use of the forms of the administrative resource that were not even
mentioned before (Den, March 28, 2002). Leader of the Greens Vitaly Kononov believes
that «the current campaign is not just totally dirty, it is even – I may say – of a
pornographic content <…> the new trend of the current election campaign is the
overwhelming presence of black PR that has tinted even such a neutral political force as
us.» Communists, according to their leader Petro Symonenko, believe that one of the
distinguishing features of the race is the fact that the election campaign used «huge sums
of money thrown into it by representatives of criminal capital. The Donetsk, Luhansk,
Kharkiv, Zaporizhya and Dnipropetrovsk clans have allocated very serious sums in order
to protect the politics that allows them to enrich themselves through a possibility to steal
by means of using the shadow structures» (Den, March 28, 2002). All of these opinions
reflect true sides of the current campaign, as notwithstanding the relatively good and
civilized election law the campaign has demonstrated a number of examples of
uncivilized behavior of its participants. Noteworthy, one of the most favored themes in
debates between politicians has been calls for fair and transparent elections – with
fairness and transparency obviously interpreted by them rather freely and in accordance
with their own political interests.
One of the most noteworthy new features of the race has been the visible decrease in
public support for Communists. For the first time in Ukraine’s political history,
Communists did not occupy the top line of opinion poll results. Election strategies of
political parties that position themselves as centrists and the right were not built as
antithesis to the left ideology. One of the reasons for that was the fact that the campaign,
for the first time in Ukraine’s history, took place in conditions of modest but stable
economic growth, with practically no pension and wage arrears, traditionally a keynote
issue of economic parts of political parties’ campaign agendas.
However, party ideology principles were broadly used in campaign strategies. Political
forces actively sought to show their voters their relation to such key global ideologies as
liberalism and social democracy, or to communism, or even a peculiar way of
conservatism demonstrated by the block of «parties of power», «Za Yedynu Ukrainu».
References to those ideologies occurred not only in the course of political debates and
meetings with voters, but were also broadly used in political advertising as a key
identification of a particular political party or block. The partiers’ and blocks’ efforts to
present their agendas to voters were organized according to the parties’ and blocks’
ideological identification.
Some of the key participants of this campaign are likely to run in the 2004 presidential
elections; therefore, for them the current campaign was a way to set foundations for a
future victory. Another new feature of this campaign is the reliance on charisma of
political leaders – at least on the collection of personal features that are believed to
constitute an image of a charismatic political personality in Ukraine. The use of the name
of a leader, his or her image, automatically extrapolated on the party or block may be
seen as an element of election techniques. A number of creators of so-called «brand
blocks» tried to do their best to convince their voters that for them politics is «a calling,
not a profession». The technique resulted in the emergence of the blocks named after
Natalia Vitrenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, and the Nasha Ukraina block of Victor
Yushchenko. The popularity of some names and the attempt to benefit from the use of
somebody else’s charisma led to several controversial situations. The most noteworthy of
them was the attempt by Oleksandr Rzhavsky MP to register a «brand» block «For
Yushchenko» and even include some namesake of the ex-prime minister of Ukraine to
the list of the block. The block, however, was not registered by the Central Election
Commission; thus, the attempt to take away some votes of disoriented voters failed. The
«brand name» blocks were not the only ones that built upon the image and perceived
charisma of leaders. The SDPU(o) advertising strategy largely relied on building an
image of the party leader Victor Medvedchuk, who was featured in the party adds as
writing letters to voters, congratulating women, cooking, etc.
Still another feature of the campaign was unprecedented spread of the use of the «twin»
technique. As many as 119 «twin» candidates – individuals with the same last names and
sometimes even with the same initials - ran for seats in 46 majoritarian constituencies.
Noteworthy, «twin» candidates were «attached» not only to the strongest and obvious
favorites, but also to their possible main competitors. The technique was used in a very
similar manner in most of the regions of Ukraine. The most notorious examples of the
«twin show» occurred in Western Ukraine. In the Lviv region, where Taras Stetskiv MP
and Oleksandr Hudyma MP ran for seats in constituencies 118 and 119, respectively,
three other Stetskivs and two other Hudymas were registered as candidates. In the
Uzhgorod election constituency #71, the regional election commission received
registration applications from six Ratushniaks – the ex-mayor of the city and five his
«followers».
While the «twin show» was used for misleading voters in majoritarian constituencies,
«cloning» of political parties was widely spread as its «partisan» option. While the
technique was an «innovation» of this race, some similarities with the 1998 campaign can
be observed: the Progressive Socialist Party, formed by Natalia Vitrenko in 1997 as an
opposite to Oleksandr Moroz’s Socialist Party, took part in the 1998 parliamentary
election. In the current campaign, the creation of political parties with similar names and
similar ideologies was used to take away a certain proportion of votes from potential
leaders of the race. A typical example of the technique was the emergence of the
Communist Party of Ukraine (renewed) and the Communist Party of Workers and
Peasants. The «old» Communist Party, led by Petro Symonenko, described the new
competitors as «the red fake led by the turncoats and traitors». While the new formations
are unlikely to become serious competitors to the «traditional» communists who boast
stable electorate and a broad network of local organizations, a small proportion of votes –
which means a lot in the race - may still be taken away from the party.
In addition to the «compromat wars» and mud baths used as election «techniques» by a
number of political forces against their participants, there was some «innovation» – the
«tape scandal» involving unauthorized recording of a private phone conversation between
leader of the Nasha Ukraina block Victor Yushchenko and mayor of Kyiv Oleksandr
Omelchenko. On the day when the moratorium on political advertising and campaigning
was lifted, February 9, head of the Rukh Press, former press secretary of the late
Vyacheslav Chornovil and present-day spokesman of the «alternative» Rukh za Yednist»
Dmytro Ponamarchuk released the recording to the media. The tape presented voices
similar to those of Victor Yushchenko and Oleksandr Omelchenko who were discussing
preparations for ousting then First Vice Speaker Victor Medvedchuk from his position.
However, the trick failed, as even the political community shortly lost interest.
The «compromat wars» were also more sophisticated than before. There were few direct
accusations like «candidate N stole a plant from its workers». Instead, political
polarization and dependence of Ukrainian media allowed the use of specific
interpretations of issues and facts related to the election campaign. The point was not
only the unequal opportunity to get access to media resources that hinde3red the
opposition political forces’ ability to campaign more effectively, but massive attacks on
competitors through presentation of badly distorted information that depicted the
competitors in the negative light in a biased manner and did not leave the accused any
chance to present their views on the issue. Rather often, the media assisted increasing
publicity of «enemies of their enemy» in order to help the opponents of the opponents of
those who controlled the media to take away some votes and, thus, weaken their chances.
While in 1998 the Greens managed to overcome the 4-percent barrier, in the 2002
campaign they, as well as another forces that relied mainly on aggressive political
advertising strategy, the Komanda Ozymoho Pokolinnya (KOP), failed to convince
enough voters. Within the past month, the KOP opted for vast television presence to
advertise their motto of bringing new people and liberal ideology to politics. The example
illustrates the attempt to build a political brand similarly to the way commercial brands
are built, and the outcome of the strategy – the failure in the elections - shows that
aggressive advertising cannot substitute systemic party work and a developed network of
local party branches.
The political advertising and campaigning was tinted with massive use of the so-called
«dirty techniques» - from dissemination of fake leaflets to more serious things – like
ordering workers of state-owned enterprises to receive official permission to vote in other
place then their place of residence, and then putting them on a bus with instructions on
how to vote and driving to another district where a certain result of the voting had to be
achieved. Substantial violations were registered in the field of transparency of campaign
finance. The loopholes in the legislation made it possible to hide substantial amounts of
campaign funds. Meanwhile, official reports about the campaign spending did not reflect
irregularities: by February 20, parties and blocks received the total of UAH 13,312
thousand and spend the total of UAH 5,748 thousand. According to the CEC, the largest
campaign spending was recorded for «Za Yedynu Ukrainu» (UAH 1,365 thousand), the
Yabluko party (UAH 1,166 thousand), «Nasha Ukraina» (UAH 902,000), the SDPU(o)
UAH 503,000, and the Green Party UAH 405,000. However, the volume of political
advertising broadcast by the TV, judging from official advertising rates, substantially
exceeded the officially declared figures. Hence, this campaign was financed in no less a
shadow manner than the previous ones.
Officially the political advertising campaign started only on February 9, 2002, though the
campaign itself officially began on December 31, 2001. The 40-day moratorium on
political campaigning and advertising was introduced in accordance with the election law
(Article 50) that stipulates that «the election campaigning begins 50 days before the
polling day». While the provision was criticized as limitation of the right of the media to
inform about the election process and the right of voters to receive such information, the
law had to be observed, though individual violations were reported and the violators
reprimanded by the CEC. However, the law did not prohibit campaigning (and, in fact,
unlimited spending) before the official start of the race. The loophole was used by many
parties, blocks and candidates who used the time and the lack of regulations to bribe their
potential voters with various sorts of «assistance», «presents» and charity actions. Some
of the parties and blocks did not stop such actions even during the race - which is illegal –
but no reaction of the CEC followed.
One of the key themes of the race has been the use of the so-called «administrative
resource» – a whole set of mechanisms, tools and techniques that allow state authorities
to interfere with the course of an election campaign in favor of or against specific
political forces. The state authorities influenced the race by means of controlling access
to key resources: material (budget funds and material reserves), administrative pressure
and command, control over national and regional media (the so-called information
resource), business, public institutions and services, NGOs, municipal services, hospitals,
educational institutions etc. Noteworthy, the actions of state authorities designed to favor
a particular force and/or create problems for other participants of the race do not
necessarily constitute violation of the law. Although the election law and the new
Criminal Code have provisions for sanctions and even for jail sentence for interference
with the election process, no criminal cases have been initiated so far.
The campaign has represented broad use of influence of the state authorities on the
election process – from forcing «working collectives» of state-owned enterprises,
schools, hospitals and alike to join the «parties of power» to preventing «other» political
forces from campaigning effectively through creating technical obstacles to them (like
cutting off electricity or refusing to lease a large public facility for organizing a meeting
with voters). Direct instructions from civil servants to their subordinates as to the force or
candidate they should vote for have been often reported by observers. It is impossible to
say, though, how much of the votes those methods will eventually bring to the parties and
blocks, as the final say still rests with the voters. But the results of their assessment of the
parties’, blocks’ and candidates’ pledges and electoral behavior is a different story.
